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A changing landscape
In 2009 the global economy switched from recession to recovery. However, the pace of the recovery
has been very different in different parts of  the world,  with the divergence between emerging and
mature economies becoming greater than expected. Europe and emerging Asia are in this respect in
clearly opposite situations, while the Japanese situation is closer to that of Europe than to those of its
neighbours (Figure 1 on the next page).
In the midst of the crisis, fiscal expansion was the order of the day for all countries, but exit strategies
now  involve  a  differentiated  approach.  Meanwhile,  global  imbalances  have  been  reduced  but  they
remain  a  major  issue  (Figure  2  on  the  next  page).  These  developments  have  a  bearing  on  the
implementation of the Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth, which came out of the
Pittsburgh  G20  summit  in  September  2009.  Peer  assessment  of  national  macroeconomic  and
structural policy programmes however remains essential. 
One  striking  novelty  of  this  ambitious  approach  is  that  macroeconomic  policy  is  now  fully
interconnected with structural reforms. The traditional approach to international coordination tends to
focus on macroeconomic policy, whereas structural reforms are mostly left to national decisions and
are implemented depending on political opportunity windows2. In Europe, there is a (very moderately
successful) coordination of structural reforms, but they are essentially targeted at the promotion of
growth and  employment  and bear  no relationship to  any  external  rebalancing  agenda.  In  the G20
1 This policy paper draws on the meeting of the Asia-Europe Economic Forum held in Tokyo on 25 March 2010. All
presentations are available at /www.bruegel.org/research/asia-europe-economic-forum-aeef.html. The authors are
grateful to the European Commission (DG ECFIN) for supporting the conference, and to the Japanese Ministry of
Finance for hosting it. The authors are also grateful to Benjamin Carton and Hélène Vuillermet for drafting a first version
of this paper.
2 This is not an entirely accurate description as G7 coordination in some instances included an emphasis on structural
reforms, but the content of these reforms was mostly left to national decisions.
1
framework,  however,  structural  reforms  are  contemplated  alongside  macroeconomic  policies  as
ingredients for the rebalancing of growth. 
Additionally, global issues such as the role of the International Monetary Fund or the reform of the
international monetary system, are increasingly debated because the goal is to create a framework in
which national policies are subject to appropriate incentives.
Figure 1: GDP growth in selected countries and areas (percentage per year)
Source: IMF WEO, April 2010.
Figure 2: Current account balance in selected countries and areas (percent of GDP)
Source: IMF WEO, April 2010
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Exit strategies: one size does not fit all
Divergence in the pace of economic recovery between emerging and advanced countries has finally
rehabilitated the decoupling hypothesis. In China and India, the economic crisis has been short lived,
and the priority is no longer recovery, but maintaining high and sustainable growth rates while avoiding
financial bubbles.
For advanced economies, the global crisis might well have a lasting impact on potential output levels,
although  maybe  not  on  potential  growth  rates.  According  to  the  OECD,  potential  output  might  on
average have fallen by around four percent as a result of the crisis, and there is considerable variance
across countries (the output loss ranges from three percent in Austria and the US to as much as nine
percent in Spain, see Figure 3). A higher capital cost could account for around two percent of output
loss  in  all  countries,  the  differences  across  countries  being  mostly  due  to  asymmetries  in  the
magnitude of the shock and the reactions of the labour markets. The sequencing and timing of exit
strategies is crucial, because there is no fiscal space to allow for a second stimulus, in case of a double-
dip recovery. Exiting too early would hamper the recovery, and exiting too late would endanger the
sustainability of public finances. Though this trade-off is the same everywhere, the sequencing and
pace of the exit differ very much between countries. In Korea, for example, the government has largely
substituted for the private sector during the crisis. The exit strategy should then focus on encouraging
the recovery of the private sector, in order to reverse this substitution3.
Figure 3: Total estimated peak effect of the crisis on OECD potential output by country, in percent of
GDP
Source: OECD (2010), 'The impact of the economic crisis on potential output', Working Party No. 1 on Macroeconomic and
Structural Policy Analysis, ECO/CPE/WP1(2010)3, February
3 From the presentation by Jae-Young Lee, 'Korea: growth recovery and exit strategy'.
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In brief, exits from large-scale, stimulating macroeconomic policies will differ as resurgent inflation and
asset-price bubbles in emerging countries lead to a tightening of monetary policy, while weak private
demand and low inflation rates, and the significant increase of debt levels lead to fiscal adjustment and
low interest rates for a prolonged period in mature economies.
Different  situations  and  policies  naturally  call  for  adjustments  to  exchange  rates.  Hence,  fixed
exchange-rate  regimes  across  regions  where  economic  developments  differ  will  be  increasingly
challenged as the recovery develops. This macro view, rather than the bilateral trade view often held in
policy  circles,  is  considered  by  economists  relevant  for  assessing  exchange-rate  policies.  For  this
reason  also,  an  appreciation  of  the   renminbi  is  no  longer  seen  as  a  handicap  by  most  Chinese
economists;  their  view  is  that  external  political  pressure  will  likely  delay  rather  than  accelerate  a
change of policy in Beijing.
Structural reforms and growth 
A  reduced  fiscal  space  and  the  desire  to  normalise  monetary  policy  (even  though  events  do  not
necessarily favour it), have shifted attention to structural reforms, which are now viewed as being part
of the policy mix, in some cases because of their demand effects. In India, for example, where there is
little opportunity for boosting aggregate demand because of current-account deficits, financial reforms
aim to direct domestic savings towards financing domestic investment, especially for infrastructure,
and supply-side policies that focus on non-tradable sectors are part of employment and anti-inflation
policies. In China, the high savings rate is peculiar to households, firms or the government: China is
unique  in  piling  up  savings  from  the  three  sectors  simultaneously  (Figure  4).  This  calls  for
complementing the measures directed at households (especially the building up of a universal social
security system) with structural  reforms of the financial  sector and of the government sector (for
example, better channelling of central revenues to local governments).
Figure 4: Savings 2005-2007, in % of GDP
Source: Guonan MA, 'China's high saving rate: myths and realities', forthcoming
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Budgetary policy
For  Europe,  the  question  today  is  how  to  restore  fiscal  sustainability  while  carrying  out  growth-
enhancing structural reforms. It is now recognised that macroeconomic surveillance has failed in the
EU  over  the  last  decade,  in  part  because  it  was  not  effective  enough  and  in  part  because  it  was
excessively focused on public savings, while neglecting private behaviour. For instance, while the real
estate bubble was building up in Spain, public action to curb the surge in prices was dismissed by the
Spanish authorities on the grounds that it would distort private behaviour. With the bursting of the
bubble and the global crisis, the fall in GDP and tax revenues were so pronounced that public finances
suddenly moved from a two percent of GDP surplus in 2007 to an 11 percent deficit in 2009. The cases
of Ireland and the United Kingdom are even more spectacular, as gross public debt increased stepwise
because the governments had to massively recapitalise the banks.
Hence, a lesson from the crisis is that it is a mistake to focus only on public sector balances, since the
private sector may not save in an optimal fashion: fiscal, tax and regulatory policies can help to provide
the right incentives for private savings, particularly regarding pensions and house prices.
The international monetary system
Whether the international status of the US dollar and the exchange-rate regime of China have been
major causes of the global crisis is still hotly debated in academic circles. The most common view is
that the crisis resulted from a mix of misguided micro and macroeconomic policies, including interest
rates that were too low, which may have partially resulted from the functioning of the international
monetary system.
As to the agenda, the debate is still relatively quiet. The most widely held view among economists is
that the US dollar will remain the dominant currency for a long time. Although they admit a move to a
multi-polar system is likely in the long run, this appears to them as a remote prospect. 
One reason for such a view is that the euro is not considered to be a compelling competitor to the dollar.
When the dollar supplanted sterling4, the move was consistent with the relative dynamics of the two
countries in the global economy. Today, the euro area is in no way a more dynamic zone than the US
and, even if it is able to reform and grow, its share of the world economy is set to shrink in the decades
ahead. As for the renminbi, it is based on a strong, fast-growing economy, but cannot gain international
status before its complete convertibility is achieved. Hence, the status quo may last for some time.
Additionally, some features of the international monetary system, such as the technicalities of the
Chiang Mai scheme, continue to encourage reserve accumulation in dollars. As a matter of fact, the
evolution  of  the  exchange  rate  of  the  dollar  since  the  collapse  of  Lehman  Brothers  cannot  be
understood  without  the  help  of  the  safe-haven  hypothesis5.  A  comparison  with  sterling  is  in  this
respect telling, because the UK and the US broadly suffered from the same type of shock at the same
time (Figure 5 on the next page).
4 The date of this shift is still very controversial, from the 1920s to the second world war. See Barry Eichengreen (2008)
'The rise and fall of the dollar, or when did the dollar replace sterling as the leading international currency?', National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), working paper 14154, July
5 See Bénassy-Quéré, A. (2009) 'The dollar: unsafe haven', La Lettre du CEPII No. 989, July
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Figure 5: Nominal effective exchange rates of the US dollar and sterling in the crisis
Sources: Federal Reserve, BIS. Last observation: 9 March 2010. Note: nominal effective exchange rates  (US: 27 currencies;
pound sterling: 58 currencies)6
The debate on the comparative stability of a multicurrency monetary system compared to a system
that relies mostly on a single currency has not been resolved so far. The theory of hegemonic stability
argues that a system organised around only one currency may be more stable insofar as the country
issuing the international currency accepts to internalise externalities and take on more than its share
of the burden of maintaining global stability7.
The problem with this theory is that it can hardly be argued that the US has been doing more than its
share of maintaining global stability. Additionally, its share in world GDP is declining, which reduces the
scope for the stability of a system based on the US dollar8. Conversely, a multipolar system may yield
more  exchange-rate  instability  due  to  higher  substitutability  across  key  currencies.  However  such
instability may be easier to live with due to enhanced portfolio diversification and possibly regional
arrangements.
Governance
At  the  Pittsburgh  G20  summit  in  September  2009,  it  was  decided  to  make  the  G20  the  main
international coordination forum for economic policy and financial regulation. Was this a good decision
in view of the fact that the agenda from the previous summit in London in April 2009 had still not been
entirely implemented? The G20 in 2009 succeeded in organising a common response to the crisis and
initiated an ambitious revamping of financial regulation. However the momentum for cooperation has
6 From the presentation by Frank Moss, 'Global currency constellations'.
7 See Charles Kindelberger (1973) The World in Depression, University of California Press, and for a critical discussion,
Barry Eichengreen (1987) 'Hegemonic stability theories of the international monetary system', NBER Working Paper
2193
8 Jean Pisani-Ferry (2009) 'China and the world economy',  Bruegel
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weakened since the green shoots of the recovery were observed9. Nevertheless the G20 has burdened
itself with a new, difficult task: the rebalancing of global growth.
Although it  is  surely too early to assess the achievements of  the G20,  two weaknesses are worth
noting:
First, the G20 remains an informal grouping without a permanent secretariat.  Some argue that the
flexibility of the G20 is the necessary condition of its effectiveness. However flexibility may be more
valuable in the middle of the storm, when reacting to immediate threats, than when the storm is over
and the focus moves to avoiding the next crisis. In the latter case, some structure may be useful to
regularly remind heads of state and government of their commitments. 
Second, although obviously more representative of economic power and world population than the G8,
the G20 lacks legitimacy compared to international organisations such as the United Nations or the
Bretton Woods institutions. Indeed, most countries in the world are not represented at the G20. This
was not a problem for the G7/G8 as it was clearly not representative of the world at large but it is a
problem for the G20 which is at the same time too large for a club and too small for a representative
body.
One possibility that has been discussed could be to organise representation on a regional basis. This
would make sense especially when global imbalances or the international monetary system are at
stake. However, such move would probably reduce the effectiveness of the G20 as it would turn it into
an information-sharing rather than a decision-making forum, and would weaken the heads of states
and governments’ ownership of it.
Although in Pittsburgh the G20 was declared the premier forum for international coordination, it does
not yet have an established future. Its future as the key international-coordination forum depends on
its  success  in  carrying  out  three  major  undertakings:  (i)  achieve  the  ambitious  revamping  of
international finance; (ii) carry-out the global-rebalancing agenda while introducing new incentives to
avoid  a  repetition  of  the  leverage-cum-South-North  capital  flows  spiral;  (iii)  organise  an  effective
dialogue with those countries that have been left  out of  the G20 but nevertheless will  be strongly
impacted by G20 action on the points mentioned above.
9 The unambitious chararacter of the G20 ministerial communiqué of April 2009 is telling in this respect. 
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